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The prevalence of social media has increased the 
propagation of toxic behavior among users. Toxicity 
can have detrimental effects on users’ emotion and 
insight and disrupt beneficial discourse. Evaluating the 
propagation of toxic content on social networks such as 
Twitter can provide the opportunity to understand the 
characteristics of this harmful phenomena. Identifying a 
mathematical model that can describe the propagation 
of toxic content on social networks is a valuable 
approach to this evaluation. In this paper, we utilized 
the SEIZ (Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, Skeptic) 
epidemiological model to find a mathematical model for 
the propagation of toxic content related to COVID-19 
topics on Twitter. We collected Twitter data based on 
specific hashtags related to different COVID-19 topics 
such as covid, mask, vaccine, and lockdown. The 
findings demonstrate that the SEIZ model can properly 
model the propagation of toxicity on a social network 
with relatively low error. Determining an efficient 
mathematical model can increase the understanding of 
the dynamics of the propagation of toxicity on a social 
network such as Twitter. This understanding can help 
researchers and policymakers to develop methods to 




1. Introduction  
There is evidence of a growing population of users 
on social media platforms that post and share content 
that is considered “toxic” in that it contains profanity, 
insults, sexual themes, etc. These toxic users can disrupt 
the principles of a social media platform and can cause 
harmful effects on other users’ emotions and opinions. 
In this study, we adopt the operational definition of 
toxicity from previous literature: “the usage of rude, 
disrespectful, or unreasonable language that will likely 
provoke or make another user leave a discussion” [1]–
[3]. The propagation of toxicity may have significant 
effects on different aspects of people’s lives. However, 
spreading toxicity and inappropriate insight about 
healthcare subjects can be more harmful and can pose a 
serious threat to people’s health. 
This study is motivated by how toxicity could 
influence people’s behaviors on social media, 
specifically relative to public health issues. We 
attempted to apply a mathematical model to explain how 
toxicity propagates on Twitter, particularly for COVID-
19 discourse. We collected four different datasets 
containing COVID-19 hashtags during the entirety of 
2020. We were motivated to apply a particular 
epidemiological model to determine the diffusion trends 
of toxicity on Twitter. The basis of epidemiological 
models involves dividing the population into different 
compartments that each represent the state of an 
individual involved in the considered social network.  
In this research, we have applied the SEIZ 
(Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, and Skeptic) model, 
which is a strong model for the propagation of 
information and ideas compared to the other 
epidemiological models [4]. Unlike traditional 
epidemiological models (e.g., SIS and SIR), the SEIZ 
model has an additional compartment for Exposed (E) 
individuals, who do not react immediately to the 
information they receive on social media and need some 
time to become infected by the information. The 
Infected group is defined as users whose posts (or tweets 
in the case of Twitter) contain toxicity. Moreover, this 
model has a Skeptic (Z) compartment, which contains 
users who have seen the post, but are indifferent to the 
information and decided not to engage in any response 
to it. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
prior study which has empirically applied an 
epidemiological model to the propagation of toxicity on 





Twitter. The main goal of this study is to find a 
mathematical model that explains the propagation of 
toxicity regarding COVID-19 issues on Twitter. A 
robust mathematical model for the propagation of 
toxicity on online social networks can enable 
researchers to evaluate the number of users in any 
compartment at any time. In these models, however, the 
Infected compartment is of primary importance since it 
is composed of the users who actively spread the 
toxicity.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the related work that has been done 
regarding the concept underlying the spread of emotion, 
the existence of toxicity on social media, and efforts 
regarding the application of epidemiological modeling 
to online social networks. In section 3, the 
methodologies for data collection and analysis are 
explained. We also describe the basics of two of the 
traditional epidemiological models (SIS, SIR) and then 
these models are compared to the SEIZ model, which is 
utilized in this study. In section 4, we discuss the 
overarching themes and impact of this research. Finally, 
section 5 concludes the paper with ideas for future work. 
2. Literature Review 
People are struggling emotionally during the 
current Coronavirus pandemic, especially on social 
media platforms, and they often express and share their 
feelings. A large body of evidence suggests that toxic 
expressions are almost always accompanied by negative 
emotions [5]. As there are more works on modeling the 
spread of emotion than the spread of toxicity on social 
media, we reviewed these works to get inspiration to 
understand how to model the spread of toxicity. To 
study the issue on social media from a literature 
standpoint, reviews have focused on emotion, toxicity, 
and epidemiological models.  
2.1. Spread of Emotion 
Recent studies suggest that similar to in-person 
communications, human emotions also disseminate 
through conscious and unconscious pathways [6]. 
Emotional states such as joy, sadness, trust, disgust, 
fear, anger, surprise, and anticipation could be 
contagious in online social media discourse and the 
influence could be daunting and intimidating from the 
network’s circles to users. However, the underlying 
mechanisms of emotional contagion in social media are 
rarely investigated. Kramer et al. studied controlled 
news feeds provided to users resulting in experimental 
evidence for emotional contagion via the Facebook 
network [6]. In another study that divided individuals 
into two classes of highly and scarcely susceptible to 
emotional contagion, Ferrara et al. [7] showed that there 
is a linear relationship between the average positive and 
negative emotions of the post that users are exposed to, 
and that of their response they have to that stimuli post. 
Additionally, the scarcely susceptible users were more 
likely to espouse negative emotions. Kwon and Gruzd 
[8] studied the spread of blasphemy by two mechanisms 
known as mimicry and social interaction effect on 
YouTube in which public swearing starts a chain of 
interpersonal swearing. The study is based upon mixed-
effect logistic regression models and data were 
composed of offensive comments in reply to the 2016 
U.S. presidential campaign. The most recent study by 
Fan and et al. [9] examined the spread of angry tweets 
on Weibo, a Chinese microblogging site similar to 
Facebook. Employing a diffusion model illustrated that 
weaker social network ties accelerated propagation of 
anger with respect to the metrics of velocity and 
coverage. The authors also found that strangers have a 
greater tendency to broadcast rage rather than joy. 
2.2. Toxicity on Social Media 
Cheng et al. [10] demonstrated that toxic users 
become worse over time as measured by the content 
they post. In another study, Cheng et al. [3] concluded 
that given the right condition, anyone can exhibit toxic 
tendencies. A comprehensive examination of various 
forms of online toxicity was conducted by Warner et al. 
[11]. Researchers have proposed ways to identify and 
mitigate hate speech (toxicity) in online communities 
[12], [13]. Wulczyn et al. [13] applied machine learning 
techniques including linear regression and multilayer 
perceptron in an attempt to identify personal attacks at 
scale, concluding that the problem remains surprisingly 
difficult. To aid in the identification endeavor, Davidson 
et al. [14] presented a dataset with three kinds of 
comments: hate speech, offensive but non hateful 
speech, and neither. In another study, five different 
forms of toxicity between the comments posted on “pro- 
and anti-NATO” channels on YouTube were evaluated 
[1]. They authors used the “YouTube Data API” and the 
YouTubeTracker tool [16] to collect a large dataset of 
YouTube comments for analysis. They then assigned a 
toxicity score to each comment using “Google’s 
Perspective API”. Their analysis demonstrated that 
comments on pro-NATO channels were less toxic than 
those on the anti-NATO channels. In another paper, 
Obadimu et al. propoosed an epidemiological model to 
evaluate the spread of toxicity on YouTube [15]. 
Termed the STRS (Susceptible, Toxic, Recovered, 
Susceptible) model, the authors proposed that there is a 
similarity between the propagation of toxicity on 
YouTube and the spread of a disease in a population. 
Their paper adopted a theoretical approach, wherein no 
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real-world data was used to evaluate the STRS model. 
We conducted a subsequent comparative analysis, 
however, which showed that the SEIZ model 
outperformed the STRS model. Due to the page 
limitation of this current work, our evaluation between 
the STRS and the SEIZ models has not been included in 
this current study. However, we do plan to include that 
evaluation along with the evaluation of other 
epidemiological models in our extended version of this 
work. 
2.3. Epidemiological Modeling in Social 
Networks 
Applying a mathematical model to evaluate the 
spread of ideas on an Online Social Network (OSN) can 
provide us with the opportunity to acquire effective 
information toward its propagation. As a result, we can 
set the stage for useful approaches and policies to 
control this propagation [17]. The basic framework for 
all epidemiological models involves dividing the 
population into different compartments. The primary 
epidemic model is the SI (Susceptible- Infected) model, 
which partitions the total population into Susceptible 
and Infected compartments based on disease state. In 
this model, the Infected compartment involves 
individuals who are already carrying the infection, while 
the Susceptible compartment consists of people who 
have not yet acquired the infection but are at risk of 
contracting the infection from Infected individuals [18]. 
Moreover, people who are infected may be transferred 
to the Susceptible compartment again, which is part of 
the SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible) model [15]. 
The SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model is 
another epidemiological model frequently used in 
different studies. This model includes the Recovered 
compartment, which involves individuals who develop 
immunity to the infection [19]–[21]. 
The similarity between the propagation of a disease 
and a rumor in mathematical terms was first studied by 
Daley and Kendall [22], [23]. Over the years, different 
epidemiological models derived from the SIR model 
were applied to evaluate the propagation of information 
and rumors in a population [24]. Abdullah et al. (2011) 
applied the SIR model to study the spread of news on 
Twitter. Their findings acknowledged their hypothesis 
about the similarity between the propagation of disease 
and the spread of information on Twitter [20]. In another 
study, Jin et al. (2013) used an epidemiological model 
to evaluate the propagation of news and rumors on 
Twitter. The authors applied the SEIZ model to evaluate 
the diffusion trends of four news items and four rumors 
on Twitter. Their model includes a Skeptic (Z) 
compartment, which consists of users who know about 
the story but decided not to spread it. It also includes 
Exposed (E) individuals, which are users who know 
about the news but needed some time to decide whether 
to spread it [17]. 
3. Methodology 
In this section, methods used for data collection are 
described. We then discuss the application of 
epidemiological models. We then provide a detailed 
description of the SEIZ model, which was ultimately 
used as the model for our datasets. 
3.1. Data Collection and Processing 
We used Twitter Academic APIs to collect tweets 
related to COVID-19 for the entire year of 2020. We 
collected data for different hashtags that could best 
cover a broad range of topics related to COVID-19. 
These topics included the following: lockdown, mask, 
and vaccine. These hashtags were chosen after doing a 
qualitative analysis on Twitter to find frequent and 
commonly used hashtags during the pandemic. Our 
dataset contains original tweets as well as retweets and 
replies. There was no language restriction as the toxicity 
computation also works for non-English languages. The 
list of identified hashtags and their respective number of 
tweets is shown in Table 1. Table 1 also includes the 
error metric relative to our experiments, which we 
discuss in more detail in section 4.3. 
 



































To provide contextual insights, Table 2 provides 
some examples of tweets containing the identified 






Table 2. Example tweet from each dataset 
Dataset Post Text-
toxicity 
#f*cklockdown If we get locked down for 2 weeks 
Boris Johnson can s*ck my left ball 
if he thinks I'm going to stay in my 
house for that long 
#f*ckthelockdown 
0.84 
#f*ckmask F*ck mask in public. i wear glasses, 
that sh*t doesn’t work for me. Ya 
know we be fogged up with that 
sh*t. Cloth doesn’t cover u from 
sh*t. get a gas mask if u scared 
#f*ckmask 
0.99 
#f*ckvaccine China unleashes a virus that 
bankrupts most of the world and 
now governments want to force 
experimental vaccines on its 
citizens. Is any country going to 
hold these f*ckers responsible for 
this? #fuckthevaccine 
0.95 
#f*ckcovid I’m ashamed to call myself and 
American, we really failed to 




To evaluate the propagation of toxicity on social 
networks, and specifically on Twitter, we used an 
epidemiological model, which divides the population 
into different compartments. 
3.2.1. SIS Model 
The SIS model is one of the preliminary 
epidemiological models which divides the population 
into two parts: Susceptible (S) and Infected (I) 
(Figure1). Since there is no accounting for immunity 
against the infection in the SIS model, the Infected 
individual returns to the Susceptible compartment. To 
adapt this model to the idea of the spread of the toxicity 
on Twitter, we used a new definition for these groups. 
A user is Infected if they post a tweet using a hashtag 
identified in our qualitative analysis as one with the 
potential of propagating toxicity, and Susceptible if they 
have not yet posted tweets using the mentioned hashtag. 
When a Susceptible user contacts an Infected user, the 
user will become Infected and will post a tweet using the 
hashtag [16]. 
 
Figure 1. SIS model 
3.2.2. SIR Model 
Another model, which is more often used in 
different studies and is more practical than the SIS 
model, is the SIR model. This model divides the 
population into three different parts: Susceptible (S), 
Infected (I), and Recovered (R) (Figure 2). In this 
model, Infected people consist of people who have the 
infection and can spread it to others. Susceptible people 
are individuals who are at risk of becoming infected. 
The Recovered people are those who are immune from 
the infection or have died from the infection; 
consequently, they cannot cause another person to 
become infected [19].  
To adjust this model to the spread of toxicity on 
Twitter, we allocated new definitions to these terms. A 
user is Infected if they post a tweet using a hashtag 
identified in our qualitative analysis as one with the 
potential of propagating toxicity and they are 
Susceptible if they follow the Infected person and have 
not yet posted a tweet containing the specific hashtag 
themselves. They are Recovered if they have not 
subsequently posted tweets containing the specific 
hashtag within a certain time frame. 
 
 
Figure 2. SIR model 
 
3.2.3. SEIZ Model 
One important restriction of the SIS and SIR 
traditional epidemiological models is that when a 
Susceptible individual encounters an Infected user, 
there is just one possible action, which is that the user 
can becomes Infected. However, this assumption does 
not apply properly to the propagation of toxicity, 
specifically on social media. Users may have different 
mindsets when they are exposed to toxicity on social 
media. When people are exposed to toxicity on social 
media, they may be convinced to further propagate that 
toxicity after some consideration. This decision could be 
immediate for some users, while for others it may take 
some amount of time.  
Moreover, it is possible that some users are never 
affected by this toxicity and do not show any reaction to 
tweets that contain toxicity. These scenarios are possible 
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but are not covered by the basic SIS and SIR 
epidemiological models. In the context of analyzing the 
propagation of toxicity on Twitter, the different 
compartments of the SEIZ model (Figure 3) are outlined 
below. 
 
● Infected (I) relates to users who have posted tweets 
using a hashtag identified in our qualitative analysis 
as one with the potential of propagating toxicity. 
● Susceptible (S) represents users who follow the 
Infected individuals and are at the risk of getting 
infected via the contact. 
● Exposed (E) represents the users who have been 
Exposed to the tweets containing an identified 
hashtag and had a delay of time before posting an 
additional tweet using the specific hashtag. 
● Skeptic (Z) refers to individuals who have 
encountered the toxicity via a tweet but decide not to 
tweet and use the hashtag [17]. 
 
Figure 3. SEIZ model 
 
 
The following system of Ordinary Differential 
Equations (ODE) represents the SEIZ model [17]. 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
 =  − 𝛽𝑆
𝐼
𝑁
 −  𝑏𝑆
𝑍
𝑁
                      (1) 
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑡
 =  (1 − 𝑝) 𝛽𝑆
𝐼
𝑁
 +  (1 − 𝑙)𝑏𝑆
𝑍
𝑁
 −  𝜌𝐸
𝐼
𝑁
 –  𝜀𝐸 (2) 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
 =  𝑝𝛽𝑆
𝐼
𝑁
 +  𝜌𝐸
𝐼
𝑁
 +  𝜀𝐸                     (3) 
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
 =  𝑙𝑏𝑆
𝑍
𝑁
                  (4) 
 
For the above-mentioned ODEs, the parameters are 
defined in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Parameters of the SEIZ model 
Parameter Definition 
β Contact rate between S and I. 
b Contact rate between S and Z. 
ρ Contact rate between E and I. 
p Probability of S to I given contact with I. 
1-p Probability of S to E given contact with I. 
ε Transition rate of E to I (Incubation rate). 
l Probability of S to Z given contact with Z. 
1-l Probability of S to E given contact with Z. 
 
When a Susceptible (S) (the user who follows an 
Infected (I) user) comes into contact with the Infected 
person (I) with β rate, they can immediately decide to 
share the tweet with p probability, or that user may need 
some time to think about it and move to the Exposed (E) 
compartment with (1-p) probability.  
In addition, a Susceptible may come into contact 
with a Skeptic (Z) (a user who saw the tweet containing 
toxicity but decided not to tweet about it) with the rate 
b. This contact can lead to two different scenarios. The 
first possibility is that it can lead to turning the user into 
another Skeptic with the probability of l. This means 
that the user chose not to tweet about it or to not tweet 
using the specific hashtag. The second possibility is that 
the contact may result in the unintentional outcome of 
leading the user into the Exposed (E) compartment with 
the probability (1-l). Transferring users from the 
Exposed state to the Infected state can happen from two 
different scenarios. The first possibility is that the 
Exposed (E) (user who has heard about the hashtag but 
needs some time before tweeting about it and sharing 
the hashtag) may have more contact with Infected users 
with a contact rate ρ and because of this further contact 
they will become Infected. The second possibility is that 
the Exposed (E) user can move to the Infected 
compartment not because of contacting Infected users, 
but because of self-adoption with rate ε. 
4. Analysis and Results 
This section presents the research findings in three 
different parts. First, a preliminary analysis evaluates 
the frequency of the usage of the identified hashtags 
over time. Second, we discuss our toxicity analysis. 
Finally, the SEIZ model was applied to fit our different 
datasets to the Infected (I) compartment of the model. 
4.1. Frequency of Tweets 
In this section we analyze the frequency and 
cumulative sum of the tweets for different datasets. 
Again, these datasets were created based on hashtags 
that were identified in our qualitative analysis as ones 
with the potential of propagating toxicity. Due to space 
limitations, frequency and cumulative sum figures for 
all datasets are available upon request. As we can see in 
the Figure 4, the first hashtags related to masks in 2020 
were spread in early February, but with negligible 
frequency until around the beginning of May. After 
May, however, mask-related hashtag usage started to 
increase with two big spikes in early July and early 
October. The frequency of tweets for other hashtags are 
shown in figures 5, 6, and 7. The trends of propagation 

















Figure 7. Frequency of tweets for hashtag related to 
covid 
 
The spread of toxicity related to covid started in 
early February as well, with significant spikes in late 
June and late November (Figure 7). Figure 8 reveals that 
the cumulative sum of the tweeting activity increased at 
a relatively consistent rate throughout the year.   
 
 
Figure 8. Cumulative sum of tweets for hashtag related 
to covid 
 
When viewed on a cumulative scale, we can see that 
the overall posting frequency of hashtags identified as 
having the potential of propagating toxicity regarding 
masks is more prolific than for those regarding 
lockdown and vaccine (Figure 9). Interestingly, 
however, there are two considerable spikes within the 
lockdown dataset (Figure 5), late May and late October. 
Of further note, an s-shaped trend curve can be seen 
within the cumulative spread for both masks and 
vaccines (Figure 9). Within the cumulative spread 
related to lockdown, however, there are two apparent s-
shaped trend curves (Figure 9). These s-curves are 
indicative of the adoption of the use of these hashtags in 
terms of tweeting behavior. We explore these concepts 




Figure 9. Cumulative sum of tweets for hashtags 
related to lockdown, mask, and vaccine 
4.2. Computing Toxic Scores 
Although there is no doubt that the collected 
hashtags related to these different topics of COVID-19 
are toxic by nature, assigning a toxicity score for each 
post in our datasets is imperative. To do this, we used 
the Unbiased Detoxify Model which is a model from the 
2019 “Jigsaw Unintended Bias in Toxicity 
Classification” challenge [25]. This particular toxicity 
challenge model outputs seven toxicity scores: a) 
“text_toxicity”, which is the overall score for the text 
input (in this case, a tweet), b)  “severe_toxicity”, to 
identify the probability that a text input will be 
considered as severely toxic, and then five additional 







This model returns a probability score between 0 
and 1, where higher values indicate a higher probability 
of the toxicity label being applied to the text input. We 
analyzed the scores for each of these toxicity 
components for each tweet in our four datasets 
(F*ckmask, F*cklockdown, F*ckvaccine, and 
F*ckcovid). The average overall toxicity scores for the 
datasets are 0.61, 0.51, 0.55, 0.42 respectively. Also, the 
average toxicity score for the combined datasets is 0.52. 
These scores confirm that our collected datasets contain 
toxicity, wherein “toxic” content is defined as a unit of 
text input being assigned a toxicity score of 0.5 or 
greater [26]. 
Table 3 shows the percentage of posts that are toxic 
within each dataset. The “severe_toxicity” component 
was not included in our further analysis due to its low 
count (proportion) within each of our datasets. 
Additionally, a very low proportion of the tweets in our 
datasets fell within the “threat”, “identity_attack”, and 
“sexual_explicit” categories. Therefore, our subsequent 
analysis only includes that for the “text_toxicity”, 
“obscene” and “insult” toxicity categories. The highest 
average score for the obscene category was for posts 
related to vaccine, while the highest average score for 




Table 3. Percentage of Toxic posts (toxicity score of 0.5 
or greater) for different categories of toxicity 
Toxicity  
Categories 
Mask Lockdown Vaccine Covid Average 
Text 
toxicity 
64.76 54.69 57.22 38.84 53.88 
Obscene 59.35 99.9 55.98 37.65 63.22 
Threat 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.0725 
Insult 23.93 13.99 7.35 9.32 13.6475 
Identity 
attack 
0.09 0.06 0 0.09 0.06 




Figure 10. Average score for three different categories 
of toxicity for each dataset 
 
Figure 11 shows the percentage of toxic tweets 
within the text_toxicity, obscene, and insult toxicity 
categories for each dataset. One of the interesting 
findings is that 99.9 percent of the posts related to 
lockdown have a score greater than 0.5 for obscene 
which may indicate a high level of anger or otherwise 
negative sentiment from users regarding the topic of 




Figure 11. Percentage of toxic tweets (toxicity score of 
0.5 greater) by toxicity category for each dataset 
 
Figure 12 shows the evolution of the average 
toxicity score (the text_toxicity component of the 
model) over the different months of 2020 for each 
dataset. The toxicity scores for the tweets related to 
vaccine have the most fluctuation during different 
months. Also, it can be inferred from the figure that the 
tweets related to mask have the highest toxicity score in 
some months (April, August, September, November, 
December). The trend of toxicity for the covid dataset is 
more stable compared to the others, and it has a lower 
toxicity score than each of the others for about five out 
of 11 months within the year 2020. 
 
 
Figure 12. Evolution of average toxicity score 
(text_toxicity) for the year 2020 
4.3. Fitting datasets to Infected (I) component 
of the SEIZ model 
We fit the number of Infected people (those users 
who used the hashtags in each experiment) in each 24-
hour time interval as the Infected (I) compartment in the 
SEIZ model by using MATLAB. We used the lsqnonlin 
[1] function, which is a nonlinear least square curve 
fitting function to fit our model to each of the four 
datasets. To solve the ODEs, we used ode45. Results 
were obtained from a laptop with Intel Core i5 CPU and 
12 GB of RAM.  
For every dataset there are a set of optimal 
parameters which can minimize the error between the 
actual number of tweets in the Infected compartment 
(i.e., users of hashtags) and the estimated number of 
users in the Infected compartment, |I(t) - tweets(t)|. 
Parameter tables for all datasets are available upon 
request. Model fit results for hashtags were graphed in 
Figures 13 through 16. The blue dots are the actual 
tweets while the red line is the Infected (I) compartment 
of the SEIZ model. While the end point for tweets was 
the same for each of the hashtags, the starting times were 
different (Table 1).  
The “error” column in Table 1 displays the 
difference between the actual number of tweets 
containing the hashtag and the Infected compartment 
predicted by the SEIZ model, reflecting the relative 
error in 2-norm [17]. When comparing the results for 
each of the four experiments, the lowest error was 
obtained in vaccine (0.049); whereas, the highest error 
was obtained in lockdown (0.112). However, based on 
the relatively low error obtained in our experimental 
results, we conclude that the SEIZ model can be 
appropriate for modeling the spread of toxicity as based 
on different hashtags related to COVID-19. 
 
 












Figure 16. SEIZ model fit for the hashtag #F*ckcovid 
 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether 
there are similarities among the spread of epidemics in 
the real world and toxic expressions on social media. 
The latest epidemiology model employed in our study is 
the SEIZ model. To summarize, the key findings of this 
study include: 
 
● Based on the error metrics calculated for the four 
datasets used in our experiments, the SEIZ model 
predicts the Infected compartment quite well in 
terms of the spread of toxicity on Twitter.  
● The trends that are observed in the extracted datasets 
could be divided into three general categories, (a) s-
shaped curves such as in Figures 13 and 14, (b) 
tangent-shaped curves such as that in Figure 15, and 
(c) straight (or close to straight) lines such as that in 
Figure 16.  
● Although the overall performance of the SEIZ model 
was promising and satisfactory to make predictions 
in the case of s-shaped curves and in cases of straight 
(or close to straight) lines, fitting tangent-shaped 
curves was challenging, producing the highest level 
of error (the case in our lockdown dataset as shown 
in Figure 15). 
● This work reveals a limitation of the SEIZ model, 
which is its apparent inability to model the 
propagation of toxicity on a social network, 
specifically Twitter, in cases of tangent-shaped 
toxicity dissemination trends. 
● According to Tables 1 and 3 and Figure 11, three out 
of our four toxic datasets with toxicity scores of 0.5 
or greater and representing a proportion of content 
ranging from 38.84% to 64.76% were estimated by 
the SEIZ model with the lowest possible error. These 
three datasets are covid, vaccine, and mask. 
However, the lockdown dataset presents a higher 
error of fit due to its tangent-shaped trend. 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this study, we demonstrated how the propagation 
of hashtags related to COVID-19 on Twitter can be 
modeled by applying the SEIZ epidemiological model. 
We applied the I compartment of the SEIZ model to four 
different datasets containing hashtags identified in our 
qualitative analysis as ones with the potential of 
propagating toxicity for the subjects of mask, vaccine, 
lockdown, and covid. While the modeling error was 
relatively high for one dataset (lockdown: 0.112), it was 
relatively low for the remaining datasets (mask: 0.063; 
vaccine: 0.049; covid: 0.058). Such findings illustrate 
the strength of the SEIZ model to model the spread of 
toxicity on social media. Using mathematical models to 
study the spread of toxicity on social media, especially 
Twitter, can provide an opportunity to predict its trend. 
This can help policymakers to develop suitable 
strategies for controlling and preventing the spread of 
toxicity.  
In future work, we plan to apply the SEIZ model to 
datasets collected from other social media platforms, 
such as Reddit, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram. In 
addition, we plan to fit the datasets to the other 
compartments of the SEIZ model, such as the Skeptic 
(Z) compartment. As a result, we hope to find a way to 
transfer more users from the Susceptible compartment 
to the Skeptics compartment, which refers to users who 
decide not to respond or engage with toxic discourse, 
thereby preventing further spread of toxicity infections. 
Additionally, we will apply other epidemiological 
models on these datasets, compare them to previously 
published results, and determine which epidemiological 
models have the best performance. Future research also 
includes the application of epidemiological models to 
the study the spread of toxicity in various other domains, 
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